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Abstract
A field-theoretic version of Wigner’s friend (1961) illustrates how
the quantum measurement problem arises for field theory. Similarly,
considering spacelike separate measurements of entangled fields by ob-
servers akin to Wigner’s friend shows the sense in which relativistic
constraints make the measurement problem particularly difficult to
resolve in the context of a relativistic field theory. We will consider
proposals by Wigner (1961), Bloch (1967), Helwig and Kraus (1970),
and Bell (1984) for resolving the measurement problem for quantum
field theory. We will conclude by considering the possibility of giving
up rich dynamical explanation in the context of a many-maps formu-
lation of relativistic quantum field theory.
1. Wigner’s Friend
When Eugene Wigner wrote his now famous paper (1961) on the dynam-
ical role of observers in quantum mechanics, quantum field theory was flour-
ishing. Wigner believed, however, that a dynamically complete formulation
of quantum mechanics required a clear account of how quantum-mechanical
states evolve to generate determinate physical records over the course of a
measurement. In order to provide such an account, he believed that the dy-
namics of measurement interactions must be essentially different from that
of all other physical interactions.
To explain what was required for a satisfactory dynamical account of
quantum measurement, Wigner told a story of a friend F who measures an
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observable F of a system S that fails to be in an eigenstate F . Then Wigner
considered what it would be like to be the friend and what might happen if
a second observer made a subsequent measurement of the composite system
F + S. Wigner told his story in the context of the standard von Neumann-
Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics, but it might easily be translated
into the language of field theory.
Choose an inertial frame, and suppose, for simplicity, that the local state
of a field F serves to characterize both the state of system S in spatial region
RS and the state of Wigner’s friend F in a contiguous but disjoint spatial
region RF . Let ψ
S
0 (t0) represent a state where the field F is zero in RS and
let ψS+(t0) represent a state where the field is nonzero in RS at time t0 in the
chosen frame. Suppose that the field F in region RF is χFr (t0), a state that
represents that the friend is ready to observe the field value of F in region
RS. Finally, suppose a Hamiltonian of interaction between the local fields
such that when the friend observes the field F in region RS, (i) if the state
of F in RS is ψS0 (t0), then the state of F in RF and RS at time t1 after
the interaction will be χF0 (t1) ⊗ ψS0 (t1), where χF0 (t1) represents a record in
terms of the value of F in RF that there was no observed field in RS; and
(ii) if the state of F in RS is ψS+, then the state of F in RF and RS will
be χF+(t1)⊗ ψS+(t1) after the interaction, where χF+(t1) represents a record in
terms of the field value of F in RF that F was nonzero in RS.
Now suppose that the field state in region RS is a linear superposition
of the zero field and the nonzero field αψS0 (t0) + βψ
S
+(t0) at time t0 before
the measurement interaction with the field in region RF . It follows from
the unitary dynamics and from the interaction Hamiltonian described above
that the state of the field in regions RF and RS after the interaction will be
αχF0 (t1)⊗φS0 (t1) +βχF+(t1)⊗φS+(t1) (Wigner 1961, 176). On the other hand,
given the standard interpretation of quantum-mechanical states, the state of
the field in region RF after the interaction must be separable from the state
of the field in region RS and must be either χ
F
0 (t1) or χ
F
+(t1) in order for
there to be a determinate record of the friend’s measurement in terms of his
field state.1 Further, in order for the field theory to be empirical adequate,
1On the standard eigenvalue-eigenstate link, there is a determinate value for field ob-
servable O in a local region if and only if the local state of the field is an eigenstate of O.
What it takes to have a determinate measurement record in terms of local field states is
a more subtle question, but, for present purposes, we will suppose that all it requires is
for there to be a determinate local value for whatever field observable the friend in fact
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the probability of χF0 (t1) must be |α|2 and the probability of χF+(t1) must be
|β|2.
So what is the state of the field F in regions RF and RS after the inter-
action: is it the pure state (1) αχF0 (t1)⊗φS0 (t1) +βχF+(t1)⊗φS+(t1) predicted
by the unitary dynamics or is it (2) χF0 (t1) ⊗ ψS0 (t1) or (3) χF+(t1) ⊗ ψS+(t1)
with probabilities |α|2 and |β|2 respectively? If the dynamics of field theory
is unitary, and it will be insofar as it satisfies the standard dynamical con-
straints of quantum mechanics, the state of the field after the measurement
interaction must be the entangled state (1). But insofar as the quantum-
mechanical state is supposed to provide a complete physical description, the
local field state of region RF must be described by either (2) or (3) in order
for the friend to have a determinate physical record.
Note that, simply in terms of its possible information content, expression
(1) cannot by itself succeed in selecting one of the two possible measurement
outcomes. Consider the case where α = β = 1√
2
. If there is a determinate
physical measurement record in this state, then what is it? Here there is
nothing in the representation of the physical state that might, even in prin-
ciple, select a particular physical measurement record as the one that in fact
obtains. Note also, that interactions with the environment will only serve
to generate further field entanglements, which will do nothing whatsoever
to select a particular one of the two possible measurement records as the
one that obtains for Wigner’s friend. The moral is that insofar as there are
determinate physical measurement records, if the quantum-mechanical state
is taken to be complete, then field theory gets the dynamics of measurement
wrong; and insofar as there are determinate physical measurement records
and the unitary dynamics is right, the quantum-mechanical state cannot be
complete.
This is the quantum measurement problem. Wigner’s proposed reso-
lution of the problem was to stipulate a nonlinear dynamics for measure-
ment interactions.2 More specifically, Wigner stipulated that a determinate
physical record is randomly generated in accord with the standard quantum
correlates to the field observable being measured. See Barrett (2002) for further discussion
of measurement interactions in field theory.
2Wigner described the problem and his proposed solution in the context of classical,
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, but there is nothing in his description of arguments
that is not directly applicable to any formulation of quantum mechanics that postulated
a linear dynamics.
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probabilities whenever such a record is required to explain the determinate
experience of an observer who is conscious of the physical state of the sys-
tem being measured. And since, by a principle of charity, Wigner believed
that his friend must be conscious of a determinate measurement result, he
concluded that the state must be either (2) or (3) after the measurement
interaction.
One consequence of Wigner’s proposal is that the dynamics that describes
measurement interactions must be incompatible with the unitary dynamics
typically taken for granted in field theory. As Wigner himself put it, “the
quantum mechanical equation of motion cannot be linear if the preceding
argument is accepted” (1961, 177).
While postulating a violation of the standard dynamics is clearly an
unattractive option, the cost of maintaining a local unitary dynamics here
would be to suppose that state of Wigner’s friend after the interaction is (1),
which, if one assumes that the quantum-mechanical state provides a complete
physical description, is not a state where the friend can have a determinate
physical record. And this cost was unacceptable to Wigner: “to deny the
existence of the consciousness of a friend to this extent is surely an unnatural
attitude, approaching solipsism, and few people, in their hearts, will go along
with it” (Wigner 1961, 177-178).
But giving the friend determinate records by stipulating a violation of the
unitary dynamics involves a potential empirical cost. Wigner recognized that
the pure state (1) predicted by the unitary dynamics had different empirical
properties than either state, (2) or (3), that might randomly evolve on his
stipulated collapse dynamics (1961, 180-181). In particular, there will be
an observable A of the field in regions RF and RS that has state (1) as
an eigenstate with eigenvalue +1 and every state orthogonal to (1) as an
eigenstate with eigenvalue −1. So, if the state of the field is (1), then a
measurement of A will always yield the result +1; but if the state of the field
is (2) or (3), then a measurement of A will sometimes yield the result −1.
Rather than worry that the predicted violation of linearity might prove
empirically false, Wigner characterized such predictions as a virtue of his for-
mulation of quantum mechanics since they allowed one, at least in principle,
to empirically determine which systems are conscious by testing which sys-
tems in fact cause collapses of the quantum-mechanical state. On the other
hand, since Wigner’s dynamical proposal has empirical consequences, one
might be reluctant simply to stipulate that the standard unitary dynamics is
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violated during measurement interactions if there might be another way out,
especially when it is entirely unclear how the fact that a system is conscious
might affect a radical change in its dynamical properties.
Another cost of Wigner’s stipulated measurement dynamics is that it is
incompatible with the dynamical constraints of relativity. This incompati-
bility can be seen by considering a story where distant friends make almost
simultaneous measurements of an entangled field.
2. Relativistic Considerations
Special relativity denies that there is a physical matter of fact regard-
ing the temporal order of space-like separated events. If events 1 and 2 are
space-like separated, then there will be an inertial frame I where 1 occurs
first and another inertial frame J where 2 occurs first; and since the two in-
ertial frames disagree, there can be no physical matter of fact regarding the
temporal ordering of the measurements. That relativity denies that there is
a physical matter of fact concerning the temporal order of spacelike sepa-
rated events provides a straightforward way of showing the incompatibility
of Wigner’s proposed dynamics and the dynamical constraints of relativity.
Consider two boxes F1 and F2 equipped with alarm clocks. The clocks
are synchronized, then the alarm on F1 is set to noon on 1 January 2050,
and the alarm on clock F2 is set to noon plus one minute on the same date.
The local field F in each box is put into an entangled superposition
1√
2
(|0〉F1 ⊗ |+〉F2 + |+〉F1 ⊗ |0〉F2), (1)
where 0 and + indicate empirically different field configurations.3 Then the
two boxes are carefully moved apart so that the distance from one to the
other is greater than one light minute. Friend 1 is instructed to observe the
3On the unitary dynamics such entangled local field states will be ubiquitous. They
will be required to account for EPR-Bell statistical correlations. Moreover, it is taken to
be a consequence of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem (1961) that local states of a relativistic
field must be entangled for every pair of spacetime regions in even the vacuum state. See
Schlieder (1965), Redhead (1995a) and (1995b), and Clifton and Halvorson (2000) for
discussions of the physical significance of this theorem.
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field in F1 when her alarm rings and Friend 2 is instructed to observe the
field in box F2 when her alarm rings.
Now consider Wigner’s dynamical proposal, and suppose that there is a
collapse of the quantum-mechanical state when Friend 1 or Friend 2 observes
the value of F in her respective box. What is the state of F in the boxes
just before Friend 2 observes the field in her box?
Since the measurement events of the two friends are space-like separated,
there is an inertial frame where Friend 1 makes her measurement first. In this
frame, according to Wigner’s proposal, Friend 1’s measurement will collapse
the state, so the state of the field just before Friend 2 makes her measurement
will be either (I) |0〉F1 ⊗ |+〉F2 or (II) |+〉F1 ⊗ |0〉F2 with probability 1/2 for
each possible outcome.
But since the measurement events are space-like separated, there is an-
other inertial frame where Friend 2 is the first to measure the field in her
box. In this frame, the state just before Friend 2 makes her measurement is
(III) 1√
2
(|0〉F1⊗|+〉F2 + |+〉F1⊗|0〉F2) since Friend 1 has not yet observed the
entangled field.
But insofar as states (I), (II), and (III) are mutually incompatible, there
can be no physical matter of fact concerning which obtains when Friend 2
observes the field in her box. State (I) describes the field configuration in
Friend 2’s box as +, state (II) describes the field configuration in Friend 2’s
box as 0, and state (III) describes a situation where, on the standard inter-
pretation of states, there is no determinate matter of fact about which of the
two field configurations obtains. And just as with Wigner’s friend, there are
experiments that would, at least in principle, empirically distinguish between
state (I) or (II) and state (III).
Since Wigner’s dynamical proposal requires mutually incompatible field
states to obtain for the same spacetime region, it is manifestly incompatible
with the constraints of relativity if one assumes that there is a single well-
defined state of the field F in each spacetime region.4
4This is precisely what is denied by hyperplane-dependent collapse theories. The idea
is to render a collapse of the quantum-mechanical state compatible with the constraints
of relativity by allowing the physical state of a spacetime region to depend on the inertial
frame one chooses. See Albert and Aharonov (1980) and (1981), Fleming (1988), Myrvold
(2002) and (2003), and Woodcock (2007) for discussions of this approach. Such formula-
tions of quantum mechanics then allow for the collapse of the quantum-mechanical state at
the expense of postulating hyperplane-dependent quantum-mechanical states. It is, how-
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3. Direct Records for Field Theory
Since Wigner’s proposal involves stipulating a nonlinear collapse dynam-
ics that depends on conscious intervention and is incompatible with relativity,
one might hope that there is some other way to provide Wigner’s friend with
a determinate measurement record. If we cannot account for the friend’s
physical record, then we cannot account for ours; and insofar as we have
good empirical evidence for anything, we presumably have good empirical
evidence that we have determinate physical measurement records in pointer
positions, marks in notebooks, electromagnetic fields on hard drives, etc.
Perhaps the most direct way to solve the quantum measurement problem
for field theory is simply to stipulate local field states that would ensure that
there are determinate measurement records precisely where and when one
needs them. Rather than introduce a new dynamical law for measurement
interactions, here one directly specifies a specific determinate-record state for
the field that characterizes Wigner’s friend after his measurement interaction.
While this strategy is clearly ad hoc and immediately forfeits any dynamical
explanation for the production of determinate measurement records, it does
guarantee determinate measurement records in terms of the local field state
of the friend.5
A version of this proposal was considered by I. Bloch (1967). Bloch was
concerned with the difficulties one faces in reconciling quantum mechan-
ics and relativity. He understood the problem as one of finding a collapse
formulation of quantum mechanics that was both compatible with the con-
straints of special relativity and would explain the determinate measurement
records generated by particle detection experiments. Using particle counters
as quantum measuring devices, Bloch explained how one might get a weak
sort of compatibility with relativity by supposing collapses to occur along
the backward light cones of measurement interactions.6
ever, unclear that much is gained if, instead of explaining why the quantum-mechanical
state evolves in a way that is compatible with the dynamical constraints of relativity, one
simply denies that there is any frame-independent state that might satisfy such constraints.
This move renders the dynamical constraints of relativity potentially empty.
5This strategy, and spacetime maps of determinate records more generally, are discussed
in Barrett (2005b).
6Bloch’s discussion here is based on the earlier work of Aharonov, Bergmann, and
Lebowitz and directly inspired the later work of Hellwig and Kraus (1970). A closely
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Bloch concluded his discussion of relativistic quantum mechanics by de-
scribing how one might, if one pleased, define a “teleological wave function”
by stipulating the value of the wave function so that it corresponded to
whether or not each particle counter was triggered at each particular lo-
cation in spacetime where a measurement was in fact made (1967, 156).
That is, one might construct an empirically adequate spacetime map of the
quantum-mechanical state by stipulating that the local state in each region of
Minkowski spacetime is the corresponding eigenstate of the recording variable
wherever and whenever there is in fact a measurement record. One might
then complete the spacetime map by filling in local states for all other regions
subject to the constraints imposed by the states in those regions where there
is a determinate record.
There are several ways one might fill in the gaps. If one used the standard
unitary dynamics to determine the local field states outside the determinate-
record regions, then the resultant spacetime map might look as if collapses
of the wave function had generated the determinate measurement records.
Indeed, such a complete spacetime map might be constructed from Bloch’s
backward light-cone collapse prescription if one knew the result of each actual
measurement. But if one knows the result of each actual measurement, there
is a sense in which it does not really matter how one completes the spacetime
map since one already has the right determinate local measurement records
by stipulation. Such a teleological spacetime map, constructed from observed
measurement records, would clearly be both empirically adequate (by stipu-
lation) and perfectly compatible with special relativity (insofar as the theory
is understood as just a map of local field states in Minkowski spacetime).7
While Bloch considered the construction of teleological spacetime maps
for particle states, the general prescription would clearly also work to pro-
vide determinate local field states for all spacetime regions. Wigner’s friend,
related approach was also suggested by Schlieder (1968). See Hellwig and Kraus (1970,
569) for a description of how Schlieder’s spacetime maps are updated. These proposals
also foreshadowed relativistic collapse proposals like Aharonov and Albert’s (1983) and
subsequent hyperplane-dependent collapse theories.
7One might naturally suppose that a formulation of quantum mechanics is compat-
ible with relativity if it can be given without reference to any preferred inertial frame.
More specifically, one might suppose it to be sufficient that one be able to a unique local
quantum-mechanical state to all regions in Minkowski spacetime. But if this is all one
requires, then it is easy (arguably too easy!) to get a formulation of quantum mechanics
that is compatible with relativity.
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characterized in terms of local field states, would then have a determinate
measurement record, not by a special measurement dynamics, but by a direct
stipulation of the determinate-record field state that obtains for the friend
after the measurement interaction. It is the direct stipulation of local field
states that makes the map of measurement records teleological. On this ap-
proach there is no dynamical explanation of the determinate measurement
records. Indeed, such a formulation of field theory is so ad hoc as to fail to
have any general rule, dynamical or not, for assigning local field states.
Concerning the construction of such teleological spacetime maps, Bloch
concluded that “such a procedure appears to have little to recommend it”
(1967, 156). While one cannot help but agree with Bloch’s conclusion, given
the difficulty of finding a satisfactory dynamical account of the quantum
measurement process that is also compatible with the dynamical constraints
of relativity, it is perhaps unsurprising to find such teleological constructions
throughout the field theory literature.
The practice in field theory, as in quantum mechanics more generally, is
to avoid talking about measurement if at all possible.8 If one does need a de-
terminate local field state corresponding a possible measurement record, the
practice is to stipulate whatever state one needs in whatever spacetime region
one needs it as a sort of boundary condition, without any dynamical expla-
nation for how the particular local state came to be.9 The justification for
such a practice is practical expedience rather than dynamical understanding.
Hellwig and Kraus (1970) codified this practice by explicitly endorsing
precisely the sort of ad hoc teleological construction that Bloch found objec-
tionable. Their proposal amounts to stipulating the corresponding local field
8It is typically taken to be sufficient for the purposes of empirical prediction to derive
quantum amplitudes over a set of possible events. This, of course, requires no discussion
of how any particular determinate event is in fact realized. Consequently, standard texts
in field theory, for example Ryder (1996), do not discuss how physical records might be
generated over the course of a measurement interaction. Indeed, the practice of avoiding
talk of measurement is so firmly established that even to suggest that a field theory would
ideally provide an account of the dynamics of measurement interactions, since these are
physical interactions like any other, feels like bad manners.
9This is analogous to applying the collapse postulate in ordinary quantum mechanics
with no other justification than that one needs a determinate record at the end of the
measurement. In this sense, a teleological spacetime map might be thought of as the
relativistic version of stipulating ad hoc collapses of the quantum-mechanical state. The
only constraint on such records is that they should satisfy the standard quantum statistics.
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state in those spacetime regions where determinate measurement records are
in fact found, then filling in the local field states in other regions by applying
a collapse along the backward light cone of each measurement event region
in spacetime and applying the unitary dynamics everywhere else (1970, 567).
On this proposal, if Wigner’s friend finds a determinate field configuration
in region RS, then one stipulates that this particular field configuration in
fact obtains in spacetime region RS and that the corresponding field record
obtains for spacetime region RF . Similarly, in the relativistic story, if Friend 1
observes a 0 configuration and Friend 2 observes a + configuration when they
observe the entangled field in their respective boxes, then one stipulates the
corresponding local field states and records. Here one does not have the
embarrassment of having to say which observer caused the collapse. Since
there is no dynamical account of measurement records, there is nothing that
might violate the dynamical constraints of relativity.
But again, while such a teleological construction clearly provides an em-
pirically adequate model for any collection of actual determinate measure-
ment records (by stipulation) and while there is a sense in which the resul-
tant spacetime map of local field states is compatible with the dynamical
constraints of special relativity (because there is no dynamical account of
the evolution of the local field that determines measurement records), the
strategy is clearly ad hoc. Rather than being predicted by the theory, deter-
minate measurement records are put in by hand where and when one needs
them. Such a construction guarantees empirical adequacy by stipulation
rather than by theoretical success. While the resultant map of local field
states may be empirically adequate in the sense of logically entailing the de-
terminate records that were in fact found, the explanation for this predictive
success is the most impoverished imaginable. It is only because the map of
local field states was reverse-engineered from the actual measurement results
that the theory is empirically adequate.
While the teleological strategy is clearly ad hoc, it also effective in its
way. In particular, it provides a way to talk about determinate measurement
records in the language of quantum field theory whenever such talk is un-
avoidable. The salient question is whether we can do better than such ad
hoc teleological constructions.
One strategy for a principled account of determinate measurement records
is to use a hidden-variable dynamics to construct a spacetime map for the
determinate records. Here the hidden-variable dynamics is perhaps bet-
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ter understood as part of the characterization of possible physical worlds
rather than as providing dynamical explanations for the determinate phys-
ical records. The resultant field theory then simply characterizes the set of
possible determinate-record maps representing possible physical histories and
provides a probability measure over the set representing the epistemic prior
probability one should assign to each possible physical world in fact being
ours. While such a theory would not provide a rich dynamical account of
the production of determinate measurement records, it is clearly less ad hoc
than the teleological practice of stipulating determinate field records of the
sort one needs in whatever spacetime regions on needs them.
4. Beables for Quantum Field Theory
Bohmian mechanics is easily the most popular hidden-variable formula-
tion of quantum mechanics. On David Bohm’s (1952) theory, as characterized
by John Bell (1981) and (1982), a complete physical description consists of
the standard quantum-mechanical state ψ together with a specification of the
always-determinate position Q of each particle. It is the determinate parti-
cle configurations relative to the wave function that are supposed to explain
one’s determinate measurement records in this theory.
According to the theory, the standard quantum-mechanical state always
evolves in the standard deterministic unitary way. In the simplest nonrela-
tivistic case, this evolution is described by the time-dependent Schro¨dinger
equation
ih¯
∂ψ
∂t
= Hˆψ (2)
where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of the system.
The determinate particle configuration Q also evolves in a deterministic
way. For an N particle system, the particle configuration can be thought of
as being pushed around in 3N -dimensional configuration space by the flow
of the norm-squared of the wave function (the probability current) just as a
massless particle would be pushed by a compressible fluid. More specifically,
the motion of the particles is given by
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dQk
dt
=
1
mk
Im(ψ∗∇kψ)
ψ∗ψ
(3)
evaluated at the current configuration Q, where mk is the mass of particle k.
Since both the evolution of the wave function and the evolution of the
particle configuration are fully deterministic in Bohmian mechanics, in order
to get the standard quantum probabilities, one must assume a special sta-
tistical boundary condition. The distribution postulate requires that there
be a time t0 where the epistemic probability density for the configuration Q
is given by ρ(Q, t0) = |ψ(Q, t0)|2. If the distribution postulate is satisfied,
one can show that Bohm’s theory makes the standard quantum statistical
predictions as epistemic probabilities for possible particle configurations.
Bell was a strong and persistent proponent of Bohmian mechanics, but
he also realized that the theory was not entirely satisfactory. As Bell noted,
“[w]hen the cogency of Bohm’s reasoning is admitted, a final protest if often
this: it is all nonrelativistic”(1984, 171). This can be seen from the fact that
the auxiliary dynamics predicts that the velocity of a particle at a time is
typically a function of the simultaneous positions of distant particles. In this
sense, Bohmian mechanics is dynamically incompatible with relativity.
As a step toward reconciling Bohm’s theory and relativity, Bell (1984)
showed how to generalize the auxiliary dynamics (3) so that, rather than
providing always determinate particle positions, the theory provides deter-
minate local field quantities for all spacetime regions. Bell chose fermion
number density as the determinate field quantity since “[t]he distribution of
of fermion number in the world certainly includes the positions of instru-
ments, instrument pointers, ink on paper,. . . and much much more” (1984,
175). The salient point here is that Bell believed that by making fermion
density determinate, one makes all actual measurement records determinate.
This is at least plausible. If the fermion number density is everywhere deter-
minate, then regardless of whether Wigner’s friend records the outcome of
his measurement in ink marks in a spiral notebook, or data on a hard drive,
or even the positions of calcium ions in his brain, there will be a determinate
matter of fact concerning what result he got coded for in the determinate
configuration of the fermion density field.
Bell’s characterization of the field dynamics requires a preferred inertial
frame. Let three-space at a time be represented by a finite discrete lattice
with points numbered l = 1, 2, . . . , L. Define fermion number operators
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corresponding to each lattice point with eigenvalues 1, 2, . . . , 4N , where N is
the number of Dirac fields. The determinate fermion number configuration
of the world at a time n(t) then is an assignment of a particular eigenvalue to
each lattice point. This is the local beable that replaces determinate particle
position for Bell’s field-theoretic version of Bohmian mechanics. A complete
specification of physical state at time t for Bell then is (ψ(t), n(t)), where
ψ(t) is the ordinary quantum field state at time t in the preferred frame, and
the value of n(t) provides determinate measurement records.
Just as in Bohmian mechanics, the quantum-mechanical state ψ(t) evolves
according to the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation
∂tψ(t) = −iHˆψ(t), (4)
where Hˆ is the ordinary Hamiltonian. The stochastic evolution of the fermion
configuration is characterized by the transition probabilities Tnmdt for con-
figuration m jumping to configuration n in interval dt. Let the quantum
probability density Dm be defined as
Dm(t) =
∑
q
|〈mq|ψ(t)〉|2 (5)
and the current Jnm defined as
Jnm =
∑
q,p
2 Re 〈ψ(t)|nq〉〈nq| − iH|mp〉〈mp|ψ(t)〉. (6)
Then if Jnm ≥ 0,
Tnm = Jnm/Dm; (7)
otherwise, Tnm = 0. If the distribution postulate is satisfied, that is, if
the epistemic probability distribution over possible fermion configurations at
some initial time Pn(t0) is equal to the quantum probability density Dn(t0),
then Bell shows that the transitions probabilities Tnm entail the standard
quantum statistical predictions for the value of the local field quantity n(t)
at all time (Bell 1984, 175-9).10
Bell had two worries about his local beable field theory. The first was
that choosing to make fermion number density determinate looks ad hoc
since there are many other choices one might make. The puzzle of which
10See Vink (1993) for a particularly clear generalization of Bell’s dynamics.
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field observable to make determinate is the preferred basis problem for quan-
tum field theory. Bell worried that the choice of determinate field quantity
might not be experimentally significant when measurement records are de-
fined so grossly as by the positions of instrument pointers or of ink on paper.
But this is not necessarily a bad thing for Bell’s theory. While it might
be experimentally difficult, or perhaps impossible, to determine which field
observables must be determinate when such measurement records are deter-
minate, Bell’s choice of fermion density presumably does make determinate
what we typically take as measurement records. Bell briefly considered mak-
ing more than one field observable determinate, but it is typically not possi-
ble to make different local field observables determinate while preserving the
standard functional relations between the possessed values of the observables.
This is a consequence the Kochen-Specker theorem (1967) in the context of
field theory.11
Bell’s second worry was that his local beable field theory is still incom-
patible with relativity. While the auxiliary dynamics is incompatible with
relativity in that it requires a preferred inertial frame for its specification,
the fact that Bell’s theory makes the same statistical predictions as standard
quantum mechanics has two immediate consequences. If the distribution pos-
tulate is satisfied, then (i) by the standard quantum no-signaling arguments,
one cannot send superluminal signals in the theory and (ii) there is no em-
pirical way to detect which preferred inertial frame was used to calculate the
evolutions of the determinate field values. So while there is a sense in which
it is dynamically incompatible, Bell’s theory is nevertheless observationally
compatible with relativity.12
Bell notes the observational compatibility between his field theory and
relativity, but concludes that requiring a preferred frame for the dynamics
“seems and eccentric way to make a world” (1984, 180).
11See Clifton (2000) for a discussion of some of the constraints on stipulating more than
one local field observable as determinate. One might make all local field observables de-
terminate, but one would lose the functional relationships between local field observables.
See Barrett (2005a) and Tomulka (2007) for discussions of the conceptual cost of doing
this.
12This sort of compatibility between Bohmian mechanics and relativity has been often
noted. See, for example, Albert (1992) and (1999), Barrett (1999), Bohm and Hiley (1993),
Maudlin (1994) and (1996), and Dickson (1998).
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5. A Many-Maps Formulation of Field Theory
The most direct way to eliminate an appeal to a preferred inertial frame
in dynamical explanations of determinate measurement records is to give up
dynamical explanation of determinate measurement records in field theory.
Rather than provide a dynamical account of the possessed values of Bell’s
field beable n, the revised theory uses Bell’s dynamics to characterize a set of
physically possible spacetime maps with a determinate value for n specified
for each local region and a probability measure over such maps. Each map
represents a physically possible history of the world, and the probability
measure represents the prior epistemic probability of each physically possible
world being the actual physical world. As one learns the physical structure of
the actual world, one conditions on the new evidence and updates the prior
probabilities to get the standard quantum probabilities.
While the construction of physically possible maps of local field values
makes use of Bell’s auxiliary dynamics, the suggestion is that this be under-
stood only as a part of the principled specification of possible physical worlds.
That is, as opposed to the teleological strategy for constructing spacetime
maps by stipulating determinate measurement records wherever one needs
them, Bell’s dynamics provides a principled way to identify determinate local
field beables with each local spacetime region of a possible physical world.
The prescription for constructing a map of local field values that repre-
sents one physically possible world is as follows. Let F be a discrete-valued
local field observable whose being determinate would guarantee determinate
measurement records. Choose a preferred inertial frame for the purpose of
mapping the local values of F and a countable spatial lattice of simultane-
ous points at each time in the preferred inertial frame. Consider a global
quantum-mechanical state ψ defined at each point on the lattice and at all
times in the inertial frame. Physically possible global quantum-mechanical
states are characterized by a relativistic formulation of the unitary quan-
tum dynamics for F . It is in determining physically possible global states
ψ, then, that relativistic constraints matter to the empirical content of the
theory. Physically possible quantum-mechanical states, in turn, determine
physically possible maps of determinate local field values and the epistemic
probability measure over possible maps.
Choose an initial time t0 in the preferred inertial frame and randomly
assign values for F to each point in the spatial lattice so that the probability
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of particular determinate field value at a point r in the lattice is |ψ(r, t0)|2.
Evolve these determinate values in the preferred inertial frame using Bell’s
stochastic dynamics. The result provides an assignment of a determinate
value for F to the lattice points. Each such possible spacetime map MF
describes a possible physical world where the local value of F is everywhere
determinate.
The probability that a particular map of local field values MF will be gen-
erated by this prescription is determined by the global quantum-mechanical
state ψ. Consequently, given a prior probability measure over possible global
quantum-mechanical states, presumably a task for thermodynamics, the the-
ory provides a prior probability measure µ over physical possible spacetime
maps of the local field observable F . The complete field theory then might
be thought of as the set of possible spacetime field maps S together with
the measure µ that represents the epistemic prior probability of each pos-
sible map providing an accurate description of the local field values of the
actual physical world. One then updates the prior epistemic probabilities
by conditioning on actual observed field configurations to get posterior pre-
dictions regarding unobserved regions of the actual world. As in Bohmian
mechanics and Bell’s local beable field theory, the epistemic probabilities one
gets by conditioning on new empirical evidence here agree with the standard
quantum probabilities for a no-collapse formulation of quantum mechanics.
Since F is determinate in each local region of spacetime, and since it is, by
hypothesis, a field observable that makes all measurement records determi-
nant, Wigner’s friend, and everyone else, has fully determinate measurement
records.
6. Conclusion
A many-maps formulation of field theory, like Bohmian mechanics and
Bell’s field theory, but unlike teleological constructions, provides determi-
nate measurement records in a principle way. Further, the physically possi-
ble maps of local field values are determined by rules that, unlike Wigner’s
proposed dynamics, do not require one to say anything about when or where
measurements are made. Finally, a many-maps formulation of field theory
cannot be dynamically incompatible with relativity insofar as it does not
provide a dynamical account of how determinate measurement records are
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produced. The dynamical constraints of relativity still have a role to play,
but it is in characterizing possible global quantum-mechanical states, not in
giving a causal account of the generation of measurement records.13
There is no question that giving up on a dynamical explanation of physical
measurement records involves a significant conceptual cost. Rather than
providing a dynamical account of EPR correlations, for example, they are
explained in a many-maps theory by the fact that a typical physical world, in
the prior probability measure µ, will exhibit determinate local measurement
records with just such nonlocal statistical correlations, and the actual world
is expected to be typical in just this sense. On the other hand, to wish for a
rich dynamical account of EPR correlations between determinate spacelike-
separated field values, on at least one understanding of what such an account
would involve, would be to wish for a dynamical account of measurement
records that cannot possibly be compatible with the dynamical constraints
of relativity and is, in any case, ruled out by Bell’s theorem.14 Consequently,
one does not perhaps sacrifice as much as one might have thought in giving
up on a dynamical explanation of determinate measurement records.
One might still, of one wishes, think of the quantum-mechanical state
ψ dynamically and insist that the unitary dynamics describing its evolution
be put in a form compatible with the dynamical constraints of relativity.15
13This proposal thus violates one of Bell’s deeply-held physical intuitions. He felt the
that proper role of the quantum-mechanical state in a hidden-variable theory was to pro-
vide a causal explanation of the evolution of the beables: “For us [ψ] is an independent
beable of the theory. Otherwise its appearance in the transition probabilities would be
quite unintelligible” (1984, 177).
14By Bell’s theorem there can be no local dynamical or causal account of the evolution
of any local beables on which determinate measurement records might supervene. More
specifically, Bell understood his theorem as telling us that if one wants a rich dynami-
cal account of the generation of determinate measurement records, then one can do no
better than a hidden-variable theory modeled on Bohmian mechanics where the auxiliary
dynamics is necessarily nonlocal.
15Albert (2008) has recently argued that even the quantum-mechanical state cannot
generally be taken to evolve in a way that is compatible with relativistic constraints.
More specifically, he describes an interaction between entangled particles that involves a
dynamical change in the quantum-mechanical state in every inertial frame but one. Hence,
he argues, the transformation of states between frames cannot be one-to-one as required by
relativity. There is, however, reason to suppose that Albert’s impulsive particle-interaction
story will be compatible with relativistic constraints when translated into a continuous
interaction between fields.
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Indeed, the only way that relativity might play a meaningful role in a many-
maps theory is in constraining possible global quantum-mechanical states.16
16I would like to thank David Malament, Craig Callender, John Manchak, Jim Weather-
all, and Brett Bevers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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